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Abstract 
Uncertainty is inherent to our knowledge about the state of the world, yet often not 
communicated alongside scientific facts and numbers. In the “post-truth” era where facts are 
increasingly contested, a common assumption is that communicating uncertainty will reduce 
public trust. Yet, a lack of systematic research makes it difficult to evaluate such claims. We 
conducted five experiments—including one preregistered replication with a national sample 
and one field experiment on the BBC News website — (total N = 5633) to examine whether 
communicating epistemic uncertainty about facts across different topics (e.g. global warming, 
immigration), formats (verbal vs. numeric), and magnitudes (high vs low) influences public 
trust. Results show that whereas people do perceive greater uncertainty when it is 
communicated, we observed only a small decrease in trust in numbers and trustworthiness of 
the source, and mostly for verbal uncertainty communication. These results could help 
reassure all communicators of facts and science that they can be more open and transparent 
about the limits of human knowledge. 
 
Significance Statement 
Does openly communicating uncertainty around facts and numbers necessarily undermine 
audiences’ trust in the facts or the communicators? Despite concerns among scientists, 
experts, and journalists, this has not been studied extensively. In four experiments and one 
field experiment on the BBC News website, words and numerical ranges were used to 
communicate uncertainty in news article(-like) texts. The texts included contested topics such 
as climate change and immigration statistics. Whilst people’s prior beliefs about topics 
influenced their trust in the facts, they did not influence how people responded to the 
uncertainty being communicated. Communicating uncertainty numerically only exerted a 
minor effect on trust. Knowing this should allow academics and science communicators to be 
more transparent about the limits of human knowledge. 
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Main text 
\body 
Introduction 
Our knowledge is inherently uncertain. The process by which we gather information about 
the state of the world is characterized by assumptions, limitations, extrapolations, and 
generalisations, which brings imprecisions and uncertainties to the facts, numbers, and 
scientific hypotheses that express our understanding of the world around us. Yet, despite the 
fact that scientists and other producers of knowledge are usually well-aware of the 
uncertainties around their findings, these are often not communicated clearly to the public 
and other key stakeholders (1). This lack of transparency could potentially compromise 
important decisions people make based on scientific or statistical evidence, from personal 
medical decisions to government policies.  
 
Recent societal developments do not seem to encourage more openness about uncertainty: it 
has been suggested that we are living in a “post-truth” era in which facts, evidence, and 
experts are deeply mistrusted (2). Cross-national survey studies suggest that in many 
countries, trust in institutions and governments is in decline (3–5). Although the underlying 
causes of changes in trust are likely to be complex and varied, it has been suggested that one 
way to potentially repair and restore public trust in science, evidence, and official statistics is 
to be more open and transparent about scientific uncertainty (2). Yet, it is often assumed that 
communicating uncertainty transparently will invite criticism, can signal incompetence, or 
even decrease public trust in science (1, 6–8). In fact, as summarized by the National 
Academy of Science report on science communication (7), “as a rule, people dislike 
uncertainty [...] people may attribute uncertainty to poor science [… and] in some cases, 
communicating uncertainty can diminish perceived scientific authority” (p.27-28). For 
example, research by Johnson and Slovic (9) found that for some respondents, uncertainty 
“evoked doubt about agency trustworthiness” (p.490), and that “despite the general sense of 
honesty evoked [by uncertainty] … this did not seem to offset concerns about the agency’s 
competence” (p. 491). In fact, partly for these reasons, Fischhoff (1) notes that scientists may 
be reluctant to discuss the uncertainties of their work. This hesitation spans across domains: 
for example, journalists find it difficult to communicate scientific uncertainty and regularly 
choose to ignore it altogether (10, 11). Physicians are reluctant to communicate uncertainty 
about evidence to patients (12), fearing that the complexity of uncertainty may overwhelm 
and confuse patients (13, 14). Osman, Heath, and Löfstedt (15) even go as far as to argue 
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explicitly that “the drive to increase transparency on uncertainty of the scientific process 
specifically does more harm than good” (p. 131).  
 
At the same time, many organisations that produce and communicate evidence to the public, 
such as the European Food Safety Authority, have committed themselves to openness and 
transparency about their (scientific) work, which includes communicating uncertainties 
around evidence (16–19). These attempts have not gone without criticism and discussion 
about the potential impacts on public opinion (15, 20). What exactly do we know about the 
effects of communicating uncertainty around facts, numbers, and science to the public?  
 
Prior research has distinguished between two kinds of uncertainty: epistemic uncertainty 
about the past and present state of the world that arises because of what we don’t know but 
could know in theory (e.g. uncertainty due to limitations of the sample or methodology) 
versus uncertainty about the future that arises because we can’t know (i.e. randomness, 
chance; we cannot know for certain what will happen tomorrow) (21). Although uncertainty 
about the future is a widely acknowledged aspect of forecasts and predictions, epistemic 
uncertainty about the past and present is equally important yet often overlooked in 
communication: it is the uncertainty around the decrease in unemployment in the United 
Kingdom (e.g. estimated at a decrease of 119,000 people in January to March 2019 compared 
to a year earlier, with a 95% confidence interval of plus or minus 96,000) (22); or uncertainty 
around the number of people who attended  U.S. President Trump’s inauguration, which he 
famously claimed “had the biggest audience in the history of inaugural speeches” (23) 
(attendance estimated to have been between 300,000 and 600,000) (24). Psychological 
research suggests that people intuitively distinguish between these two kinds of uncertainty 
(25, 26). 
 
How people react to aleatoric uncertainty about the future has been relatively well-studied. A 
large literature indicates that people are generally averse to uncertainty when making 
decisions about the future—a psychological tendency known as ambiguity aversion (27). 
Moreover, the relatively large body of research on the interpretation of verbal expressions of 
uncertainty such as “likely” or “unlikely” shows that there is considerable variability between 
people in how they interpret these words, creating problems for effective communication 
(28–31). It has therefore been suggested that numerical communication might be preferable; 
yet several studies found that numerical uncertainty information might suffer from its own 
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interpretation issues (32–34). To illustrate, recent research has found that motivated cognition 
can have an impact on probabilistic reasoning: prior beliefs about climate change or gun laws 
in the US influenced people’s interpretation of the distribution underlying ambiguous 
numerical ranges about these issues (35).  
 
Yet, much less research has specifically focused on epistemic uncertainty. In fact, a recent 
review concluded that empirical evidence about the psychological effects—positive or 
negative—of communicating epistemic uncertainty about facts and numbers is limited and 
scattered with mixed findings (21). For example, research by Johnson and Slovic suggests 
that communicating uncertainty via numerical ranges signalled honesty and competency for 
some of their participants, but dishonesty and incompetency for others (9, 33, 36). Other 
studies, for example, in the context of cancer risk or scientific evidence about climate change 
and GMOs, found that communicating uncertainty around estimates did not seem to affect 
people’s scientific beliefs or credibility judgments (8, 37, 38).  
 
Given these mixed findings, the present research program aims to address this gap in the 
literature and is one of the first to examine the effects of communicating epistemic 
uncertainty about facts, numbers, and evidence on public trust. We examine the effects of 
communicating uncertainty around numbers—including contested numbers—that are 
communicated routinely in the media, such as the unemployment rate and migration 
statistics. Specifically, we draw on a recent theoretical review (21), which suggests that 
research on communicating epistemic uncertainty should consider its effects on three key 
conceptual dimensions, namely 1) cognition (how people perceive and understand 
uncertainty), 2) emotion (how people feel about the uncertainty) and 3) trustworthiness (the 
extent to which people trust the information). Following recent work on source credibility in 
science communication (39), we further consider and conceptually distinguish two key forms 
of trust: people’s trust in the numbers themselves and people’s trust in the “source” of these 
numbers, for example, in the organisation producing the numbers. From a purely statistical 
point of view, variability around a central estimate signals that the estimate is more uncertain; 
thus when uncertainty is taken into account, a logical conclusion would be that the central 
estimate is less informative and reliable. However, communicating uncertainty when it exists 
can be seen as part of an organisation’s goal to be open and transparent, which could foster 
perceived trustworthiness (40). Given limited and mixed prior findings, we set out to 
systematically examine how communicating uncertainty about a range of facts influences 
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public trust in both numbers and their sources in four large and diverse online experiments 
(combined N = 4,102) and one field experiment on the BBC News website (N = 1531). We 
were particularly interested in comparing the effects of communicating both verbal and 
numerical uncertainty around a (contested) numeric estimate on perceived uncertainty 
(cognition) and perceived trustworthiness.
1
  
 
In Experiment 1, 1122 participants read a short text about one of three topics, that contained 
either no uncertainty (just a point estimate), uncertainty communicated as a numerical range 
(in addition to the point estimate), or uncertainty communicated as a verbal statement (also in 
addition to the point estimate). The three topics were: the number of unemployed people in 
the United Kingdom, the number of tigers currently left in India, and the increase in the 
global average surface temperature between 1880 and 2010. We selected these topics to 
represent various ‘types’ of numbers (large vs small) as well as for variation in their level of 
‘contestedness’. That is, we expected there to be different levels of variation in prior attitudes 
towards the topics: whereas opinions on climate change are divided in the United Kingdom 
(41), we anticipated less division in opinion around the conservation of endangered animals.  
 
In the short text about unemployment for example, participants read that recently an official 
report had been published, which stated that between April and June 2017, the number of 
unemployed people in the United Kingdom was an estimated 1,484,000. Participants then 
either received no further information (control condition), or a numerical range (numerical 
uncertainty condition: “minimum 1,413,000 to maximum 1,555,000”), or an equivalent 
verbal statement (verbal uncertainty condition: “The report states that there is some 
uncertainty around this estimate, it could be somewhat higher or lower”). The source of the 
numbers was an “official report”, which was not further specified in our first experiment in 
order to avoid source bias.  
 
After reading the short text, participants first indicated how the information made them feel 
on a feeling thermometer, then were asked to recall the number they had just read about, and 
subsequently were asked a series of questions about how uncertain and reliable they 
perceived the number to be, and how trustworthy they thought the writers of the report were. 
Our measures of trust were modelled after prior studies from Johnson and Slovic (9). To 
                                                 
 
1 Effects on people’s emotions were of secondary interest and are reported in detail in the SI Appendix. 
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ensure that our findings are systematic and robust, follow-up experiments— including a pre-
registered replication—varied the magnitude of the uncertainty in the message, the style and 
format of how the uncertainty was communicated, as well as the sampling platform. 
 
Results 
 
The analyses revealed no meaningful differences between topics in how people reacted to the 
uncertainty communication. For ease of interpretation, we therefore present the results 
collapsed across topics (but see SI Appendix for further details). The results showed that our 
manipulation was effective in that participants perceived the numbers to be more uncertain 
when uncertainty was communicated either numerically or verbally (see Figure 1a). An 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) testing the effect of uncertainty communication (control vs. 
numerical vs. verbal) on perceived uncertainty of the number showed a significant main 
effect, F(2, 1119) = 138.67, p < .001; = .20. All reported post-hoc paired comparisons 
used Tukey’s HSD. People who were presented with uncertainty as a numeric range 
perceived the numbers to be significantly more uncertain compared to people in the control 
condition (M = 4.78 vs. 4.14, Mdiff = 0.64, 95%CI[0.40;0.88], d = 0.45). Participants who 
were presented with uncertainty as a verbal statement perceived the numbers to be 
significantly more uncertain than both those in the numerical (M = 5.82 vs. 4.78, Mdiff = 1.04, 
95%CI[0.80;1.28], d = 0.79) and the control conditions (M = 5.82 vs. 4.14, Mdiff = 1.68, 
95%CI[1.44;1.92], d = 1.17). 
 
We also asked participants to indicate how reliable and how trustworthy they thought the 
numbers were; given their correlation (r = .88), scores on these two questions were combined 
to form a measure of ‘trust in numbers’. The results showed that although our verbal phrase 
of uncertainty communication decreased trust in numbers, our numerical uncertainty 
communication did not (see Figure 1b). The ANOVA revealed a main effect of uncertainty 
communication format, F(2, 1119) = 60.96, p < .001; = .10. Verbal uncertainty 
communication reduced people’s trust in numbers compared to the control condition (M = 
3.51 vs. 4.52, Mdiff = -1.01, 95%CI[-1.23;-0.79], d = 0.75) and compared to numerical 
uncertainty communication (M = 3.51 vs. 4.31, Mdiff = -0.80, 95%CI[-1.03;-0.57], d = 0.60). 
Importantly, there was no significant difference in trust in numbers between the numerical 
uncertainty communication and control conditions (M = 4.31 vs. 4.52, Mdiff = -0.21, 95%CI[-
0.43;0.01],  d = 0.17).  
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Finally, we asked participants how trustworthy they thought “the writers of the report” were, 
as a measure of trust in the source. Again, we found that the verbal uncertainty 
communication led to a small significant decrease in people’s trust in the source, whereas the 
numerical uncertainty communication did not (see Figure 1c). The ANOVA showed a main 
effect of uncertainty communication format, F(2, 1119) = 11.03, p < .001;  = .02. 
Communicating uncertainty verbally reduced participant’s trust in the source, compared to 
the control condition (M = 4.19 vs. 4.55, Mdiff = -0.36, 95%CI[-0.57;-0.15], d = 0.28) and 
numerical uncertainty communication (M = 4.19 vs. 4.58, Mdiff = -0.39, 95%CI[-0.61;-0.17], 
d = 0.31). Again, there was no significant decrease for numerical uncertainty communication 
compared to control (M = 4.58 vs. 4.55, Mdiff = 0.03, 95%CI[-0.18;0.24], d = 0.02).  
 
Experiment 1 thus showed that while people did perceive uncertainty about numbers both 
when it was communicated numerically and verbally, only the verbal communication reduced 
people’s trust in the numbers and the source. In addition, the results showed no significant 
effect of uncertainty communication on people’s affect or mood; please see SI Appendix for 
the full results. Because we found no substantial differences between topics in people’s 
responses to uncertainty, Experiment 2 used only the UK employment number to study 
whether the magnitude of the uncertainty itself can influence the psychological effects of 
communicating uncertainty.   
 
Manipulating the magnitude of uncertainty 
The goal of Experiment 2 was twofold: firstly, to replicate the results from Experiment 1 (for 
unemployment) and secondly, to examine whether the magnitude of the uncertainty affected 
people’s trust in numbers and trust in the source. This experiment followed a 1 (control 
condition: no uncertainty) + 2 (numerical vs. verbal communication) x 3 (lower vs. original 
vs. higher uncertainty) between-subject design. For numerical uncertainty communication, 
we presented the original 95% confidence interval (CI), which therefore acted as a replication 
of Experiment 1; lower uncertainty using a range half the size (99.99% CI); or higher 
uncertainty using a range twice as large (68% CI) as the original CI. For verbal uncertainty 
communication, we presented the same baseline phrase as in Experiment 1 for the ‘original’ 
magnitude (“…it could be somewhat higher or lower”); less uncertainty using the phrase 
“slightly higher or lower”; or more uncertainty using the phrase “a lot higher or lower”. The 
verbal phrases were chosen to mirror the magnitude of the numerical uncertainty. 
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Firstly, we analysed the results of the ‘original uncertainty’ levels and the control condition in 
Experiment 2: a direct replication of Experiment 1. For perceived uncertainty and trust in the 
number, we replicated the results of the first experiment. The analyses, all reported in detail 
in the SI Appendix, showed that participants perceived the number to be significantly more 
uncertain when numerical uncertainty was communicated (compared to control) and when 
verbal uncertainty was communicated (compared to both control and numerical uncertainty). 
Similarly, just as in Experiment 1, participants reported less trust in the number when verbal 
uncertainty was communicated compared to both control and when numerical uncertainty 
was communicated; with no significant decrease in trust for numerical uncertainty (compared 
to control). Yet, in contrast to Experiment 1 where we found that verbal uncertainty 
communication reduced trust in the source, Experiment 2 showed no significant effect of 
uncertainty communication: both numerical and verbal uncertainty communicated did not 
decrease in people’s trust in the source, compared to control. The SI Appendix also includes 
figures presenting the means of the control and all experimental conditions (Figure S2, Panel 
A-C). 
 
Next, we examined the effects of the magnitude of uncertainty. Somewhat surprisingly, we 
found that the magnitude of the communicated uncertainty did not affect people’s perceptions 
of the uncertainty of the numbers (see Figure 2a). A two-way ANOVA of format (numeric 
vs. verbal) and magnitude (lower vs. original vs. higher) showed a significant main effect of 
format (F(1, 741) = 67.93, p < .001;  = .08), but no significant main effect of magnitude 
(F(2, 741) = 2.92, p = .06;  = .01) nor a significant interaction (F(2, 741) = 1.86, p = .16; 
 = .01). Regardless of magnitude, and as in Experiment 1, verbal uncertainty 
communication led to higher levels of perceived uncertainty than numerical uncertainty 
communication (M = 5.50 vs. 4.68, Mdiff = 0.83, 95%CI[0.63;1.03], d = 0.60).  
 
However, the results did show a small effect of magnitude on people’s trust in numbers (see 
Figure 2b). An ANOVA of format and magnitude showed a main effect of format, (F(1, 741) 
= 43.44, p < .001;  = .06), and main effect of magnitude, (F(2, 741) = 3.63, p = .03;  = 
.01), but no significant interaction (F(2, 741) = 1.44, p = .24). Regardless of magnitude, 
verbal uncertainty communication decreased trust in numbers compared to numerical 
communication (M = 3.56 vs. 4.20, Mdiff = -0.64, 95%CI[-0.83;-0.45], d = 0.48). And across 
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formats, post-hoc comparisons showed that a lower magnitude of uncertainty led to higher 
trust in numbers compared to the original range or phrase (M = 4.06 vs. 3.75, Mdiff = 0.31, 
95%CI[0.03;0.58], d = 0.23). Both comparisons were not significantly different from higher 
magnitude of uncertainty (see Figure 2b).  
 
For trust in the source, communication format (numerical or verbal) appeared to make no 
difference, but the magnitude of the uncertainty did (see Figure 2c). An ANOVA of format 
and magnitude showed no main effect of format (F(1, 741) = 0.96, p = .33), a significant 
main effect of magnitude (F(2, 741) = 4.30, p = .01;  = .01), but no significant interaction 
(F(2, 741) = 0.37, p = .69)). Regardless of format, lower magnitudes of uncertainty led to 
higher levels of trust in the source compared to the original range or phrase (M = 4.34 vs. 
4.01, Mdiff = 0.33, 95%CI[0.06;0.60], d = 0.26) but neither were significantly different from 
higher magnitude of uncertainty (M = 4.23, SD = 1.31; see Figure 2c).  
 
The results of Experiment 2 thus suggest that magnitude, communicated without further 
context, did not have a strong impact on people’s reactions to uncertainty communication: it 
did not influence perceptions of uncertainty, and only lower magnitudes of uncertainty were 
related to slightly higher levels of perceived reliability of the number and trustworthiness of 
the source. Without further context, participants might not have been able to interpret the 
numerical ranges as being relatively small or large magnitudes of uncertainty, although the 
same is not true of the verbal conditions. Whilst preliminary, what we can conclude from 
these results is that, in the absence of further context, it appears that whether uncertainty is 
communicated at all and the format in which it is communicated are more important in 
determining how people respond than the magnitude of the uncertainty in question.  
 
Varying the format of uncertainty communication 
Following these findings, we set out to systematically test the effects of additional numeric 
and verbal uncertainty communication formats in Experiment 3, and to move towards a more 
realistic and better contextualized communication scenario. This experiment had eight 
conditions, which are presented in Table 1. The choice of formats was influenced by the 
formats the UK Office for National Statistics uses to communicate uncertainty around 
unemployment numbers, which was again the context we used for this experiment for 
consistency. To improve the ecological validity of the experiment, the manipulation was 
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written as a traditional news media article and included two unemployment figures. 
Uncertainty was communicated in the same format around both figures.  
 
Results are presented in Figure 3. The level of perceived uncertainty around the numbers 
differed between formats (see Figure 3a; one-way ANOVA effect of format: F(7, 1192) = 
14.43, p < .001;  = .08). For all formats in which uncertainty was being communicated, 
except one, participants perceived the numbers to be more uncertain as compared to the 
control condition (post-hoc paired comparisons: p’s = .022 – < .001; Mdiff = 0.53–1.10; d’s = 
0.37 – 0.72). The exception was the condition in which only the word “estimated” had been 
added (Mdiff = -0.07, p = 1.00). People in this condition did not perceive the numbers to be 
more uncertain compared to those in the control condition, indicating that only using the 
word “estimated” seems insufficient to communicate the existence of uncertainty around a 
number.  
 
People’s trust in numbers similarly differed between formats (Figure 3b; F(7, 1192) = 5.97, p 
< .001;  = .03. Whereas for most formats, people’s trust in the numbers was significantly 
reduced compared to control (post-hoc paired comparisons: p’s = .035 – .011; Mdiff = -0.47 – 
-0.53;  d’s = 0.35 – 0.37), this was not the case when uncertainty was communicated with the 
word “estimated” (Mdiff = 0.13, 95%CI[-0.33;0.59], p = .98), with the implicit uncertainty 
statement (Mdiff = -0.37, 95%CI[-0.83;0.08], p = .20), or with a numerical range with point 
estimate (Mdiff = -0.10, 95%CI[-0.56;0.36], p = 1.00).  
 
In this Experiment, we assessed trust in the source by asking people to what extent they 
thought that the civil servants who were responsible for the unemployment figures were 
trustworthy. Results are shown in Figure 3c. We found that different formats did make a 
small difference to people’s trust in the source (one-way ANOVA: F(7, 1192) = 2.15, p = 
.04;  = .01). However, that difference was not between the conditions in which uncertainty 
was communicated and the control: across all formats, trust in the source did not differ 
significantly from the control condition (range M = 3.94–4.48 vs. Mcontrol = 4.24, SDcontrol = 
1.55). The difference was between specific formats: compared to people to whom uncertainty 
was communicated through the word “estimated”, people to whom uncertainty was 
communicated in the numeric +/- format or mixed format (“estimated +/-”) perceived the 
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source to be significantly less trustworthy (M = 4.48 vs. 3.94, Mdiff = 0.54, 95%CI[0.02;1.06], 
d = 0.40 and M = 4.48 vs. 3.94, Mdiff = 0.54, 95%CI[0.03;1.05], d = 0.39, respectively).  
 
To examine the boundary conditions of the effects on trust, we also asked people to indicate 
how trustworthy they thought journalists who write news articles like the ones they had read 
were and how reliable they thought government statistics in general are; these judgements did 
not differ significantly for different uncertainty communication formats (F(7, 1192) = 1.60, p 
= .13;   = .01 and F(7, 1192) = 1.60, p = .13;   = .01 respectively). 
 
In conclusion, then, the results of Experiment 3 showed that whereas participants perceived 
uncertainty when uncertainty was communicated in most numeric and verbal formats, not all 
formats affected people’s trust in the numbers. Communicating uncertainty via a numerical 
range with point estimate or an implicit verbal statement did not significantly decrease trust 
in numbers compared to the control condition. Adding the word “estimated” also did not 
decrease trust, but this format apparently failed to communicate uncertainty to people. Yet 
importantly, just as in Experiment 2, none of the uncertainty communication formats 
decreased trust in the source compared to not communicating uncertainty: there was no 
impact of uncertainty communication when we asked people about the trustworthiness of the 
civil servants responsible for the statistics, nor for journalists who write such articles.  
 
Uncertainty around contested numbers 
Experiment 2 and 3 were conducted in the context of UK unemployment numbers, which are 
generally considered not highly contested and thus might be less likely to result in changes in 
trust-related perceptions. We therefore conducted Experiment 4 in the context of UK 
migration, which is a more contested issue on which public opinion is divided(42). Our final 
experiment, Experiment 4, was preregistered on aspredicted.org 
(http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=d3xu67) and also conducted on a national sample of the 
UK population (see Methods). Participants were first asked about their attitudes towards 
migration, before being randomly selected to read one of five versions of a fictitious 
newspaper article about migration statistics, which are presented in Table 1. 
 
The results of Experiment 4 showed that, similar to Experiment 3, participants perceived the 
number to be more uncertain for all communication formats compared to the control 
condition, except for just using the word “around” before the number (see Figure 4a; one-way 
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ANOVA F(4, 1045) = 22.11, p < .001;   = .08). Post-hoc paired comparisons showed 
significant differences between the control condition versus communicating uncertainty as a 
numeric range (M = 4.47 vs. 5.27, Mdiff = -0.80, 95%CI[-1.22;-0.39], d = 0.50), using “+/-” 
(M = 4.47 vs. 5.24, Mdiff = -0.77, 95%CI[-1.19;-0.35], d = 0.50), and as an explicit verbal 
statement (M = 4.47 vs. 5.52, Mdiff = -1.06, 95%CI[-1.48;-0.64], d = 0.68).  
 
As Figure 4b shows, communication formats did affect participants’ trust in numbers (one-
way ANOVA F(4, 1044) = 7.29, p < .001;   = .03), but this overall effect was qualified by 
a significant decrease in trust for the explicit verbal statement when compared to control (M = 
3.28 vs. 3.90, Mdiff = -0.62, 95%CI[-1.01;-0.23], d = 0.42). The numerical formats and the 
verbal “around” condition did not significantly reduce trust in numbers compared to control.  
 
Furthermore, we found no effect of uncertainty communication on participants’ trust in the 
source, which in this Experiment was assessed as perceived trustworthiness of ‘the civil 
servants responsible for the migration statistics’ (F(4, 1045) = 1.91, p = .31).  
 
In summary, we found that whereas both numeric formats and the explicit verbal statement 
did communicate uncertainty around the net migration number, only the explicit verbal 
statement decreased perceived reliability of the number, and no format decreased 
participants’ perceptions of trustworthiness of the source. This pattern of results is broadly 
consistent with our preregistered hypotheses based on our previous three studies (see SI 
Appendix for more details). 
 
In addition, we also asked people to what extent they thought that a) the conclusions based on 
the number, b) the news article they just read, c) journalists who write news articles such as 
this one, and d) government statistics in general were reliable and trustworthy.  
 
This revealed firstly that format did affect trust in the conclusions (one-way ANOVA of 
format: F(4, 1045) = 3.53, p = .007;   = .01). This was due to the explicit verbal statement 
of uncertainty leading to lower trust in the conclusions than the word “around” (post-hoc 
paired comparisons: M = 3.51 vs. 3.96, Mdiff = -0.45, 95%CI[-0.84;-0.05], d = 0.30). All 
uncertainty communication formats did not differ significantly from the control condition (M 
= 3.90, SD = 1.46). 
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Secondly, there appeared to be a small effect of format on trust in the news article itself (one-
way ANOVA of format: F(4, 1042) = 2.43, p = .046;   = .01), but post-hoc paired 
comparisons did not show significant differences between formats—it was again mainly 
driven by a decrease for the explicit verbal statement compared to the control condition (M = 
3.66 vs. 4.04, Mdiff = -0.38, 95%CI[-0.77;0.01], d = 0.26).  
 
Thirdly, consistent with Experiment 3, participants’ trust in journalists and in government 
statistics in general were not significantly affected by communicating uncertainty in these 
different formats (one-way ANOVAs: F(4, 1044) = 1.93, p = .50, and F(4, 1045) = 1.73, p = 
.14, respectively). These additional findings suggest that communicating uncertainty verbally 
has an impact on the perceived reliability of the number itself and conclusions based on a 
number, but does not seem to impact judgements about the source(s) of numbers (civil 
servants or journalists), nor generalize to governmental statistics more broadly.   
 
Given the contested nature of immigration statistics, we also explored the extent to which 
people’s prior attitudes towards immigration affected the results. We split our sample into 
two groups (based on the median = 4.33): people with negative attitudes towards immigration 
(Mean = 1.00 – 4.00) and people with positive attitudes (Mean = 4.33 – 7.00). Two-way 
ANOVAs (format x immigration attitude: negative vs. positive) revealed main effects of 
immigration attitudes on perceived uncertainty, trust in numbers, and trust in the source, but 
no interaction effects. People with positive attitudes towards immigration perceived less 
uncertainty around the numbers (F(1, 1040) = 6.15, p = .01;  = .01), reported more trust in 
the numbers (F(1, 1039) = 33.39, p < .001;  = .03), and more trust in the source (F(1, 
1040) = 45.22, p < .001;  = .04) than people with negative attitudes towards immigration. 
However, we found no significant interaction effects between attitudes and communication 
format: overall, how people responded to different uncertainty communication formats was 
not affected by their prior attitudes towards immigration.  
 
To assess the robustness of these results we also conducted a series of hierarchical linear 
regressions, in which we included four dummy variables (representing the experimental 
conditions) at Step 1, immigration attitude as a continuous variable at Step 2, and the 
interaction terms between the dummies and immigration attitude at Step 3. The results were 
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the same: for perceived uncertainty, trust in the number, and trust in the source, immigration 
attitude was a significant predictor (at Step 3: β = -.09, p = 0.002; β = .26, p < .001; β = .28, p 
< .001, respectively), but none of the interactions between immigration attitude and the 
experimental conditions were significant (range β = 0.02-0.17, p = .09-.83; range β = -.17 - 
.06, p = .09-.69; range β = -.14 - 0.06, p = .17-.67, respectively). People’s prior attitudes 
towards immigration did influence their perceptions of uncertainty, trust in the immigration 
statistics, and trust in the civil servants responsible for the number, but prior attitudes did not 
influence how people responded to the uncertainty being communicated around the number.  
 
Internal meta-analysis 
To consolidate all of our main findings and to shed further light on the psychological effects 
of communicating uncertainty, we conducted a random-effects meta-analysis across all four 
studies for each of our key dependent variables. To ensure that the results were comparable, 
we only included the formats that were consistently tested across all four experiments. For 
ease of interpretation, we contrast “no uncertainty” (control condition) versus “uncertainty” 
communication, differentiating only between “verbal” (explicit verbal statement) versus 
“numeric” (numeric range with point estimate) uncertainty communication as separate 
subgroups. Results are presented in Figure 5.  
 
Overall, the communication of uncertainty in itself had a large effect on perceived 
uncertainty (d = 0.65, [95%CI 0.42; 0.87]), with the effect of verbal uncertainty (d = 0.88, 
[95%CI 0.62; 1.14]) being over twice that of numeric uncertainty (d = 0.43, [95%CI 0.33; 
0.52]).  Importantly, the communication of uncertainty did lead to a significant overall 
decrease in perceived reliability of the numbers (d = -0.34, [95%CI; -0.16; -0.53]). Although 
relatively small and non-significant across some of the studies, the weighted effect of 
providing numeric uncertainty on trust in numbers was also negative and significant                 
(d = -0.15, [95%CI; -0.05; -0.24]). However, much of the overall effect seems to stem from 
verbal uncertainty, as the negative effect of verbal uncertainty on trust in numbers was much 
more substantial (d = -0.55, [95%CI; -0.35; -0.74]). Lastly, although the weighted effect of 
the communication of uncertainty across studies did also significantly and negatively 
influence perceived trustworthiness of the source (d = -0.12, [95%CI; -0.03; -0.22]), the size 
of the effect is similarly small and seems to be driven by verbal uncertainty (d = -0.21, 
[95%CI; -0.12; -0.31]) rather than numeric uncertainty (d = -0.03, [95%CI; -0.03; 0.06]). 
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Field experiment on the BBC News website  
Finally, we assessed to what extent our findings would generalize beyond the context of an 
online lab experiment to a real-world setting. We therefore engaged in a unique and novel 
experiment on the live BBC News website to test the effects of communicating uncertainty in 
an online news article about the United Kingdom’s labour market statistics, which are 
released monthly by the Office for National Statistics.  
 
After a pilot experiment using a BBC News article about the UK labour market in September 
2019, which is reported in the SI Appendix, we conducted an experiment with an online news 
article about the UK labour market on the 15
th
 of October 2019. Readers of the live BBC 
News website were randomly shown one of three versions of the news article (see Figure 6). 
The first figure mentioned in this article was the unemployment rate, which “… unexpectedly 
rose to 3.9% in the June-to-August period from 3.8%, after the number of people in work 
unexpectedly fell by 56,000, official figures showed.” Readers were either shown this target 
figure without any uncertainty mentioned, as is common in all news reporting (including the 
BBC); with a verbal uncertainty cue (“… rose to an estimated 3.9%”), as is sometimes used 
in BBC news reporting; or with a numeric range and verbal cue (“… rose to an estimated 
3.9% (between 3.7%-4.1%)”), which is uncommon in news reporting. All other figures 
mentioned in the article were reported without uncertainty. After the first paragraph of the 
news article, which contained the figure of interest, readers were invited to take part in a 
short study about this article. As our survey had to be brief, we only included our key 
measures: after asking participants to rate their current emotional state (affect), we asked 
them how certain or uncertain they thought the unemployment rate figure in the story was, 
how trustworthy it was, and how trustworthy and competent the statisticians responsible for 
producing the figure were and how trustworthy they thought the journalist responsible for 
producing the article was. The results are presented in Figure 7. 
 
The results of this field experiment showed that, in line with the lab experiments, people 
perceived the number to be more uncertain when numerical uncertainty had been 
communicated, compared to no uncertainty communication in the control condition. An 
ANOVA showed a significant main effect of uncertainty communication on perceived 
uncertainty, F(2, 1526) = 4.67, p = .01;   = .006. Participants who read the version of the 
news article with a numeric range around the unemployment rate figure perceived the figure 
to be more uncertain than people in the control condition (M = 3.56 vs. 3.31, Mdiff = 0.25, 
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95%CI[0.06;0.44], d = 0.19). Participants who read the version of the news article with the 
verbal cue scored in between the numerical and control conditions, not significantly different 
from either (M = 3.41, SD = 1.39). This finding suggests that participants did seem to have 
noticed the uncertainty that was communicated.  
 
Uncertainty communication however did not affect participants’ trust in the number (F(2, 
1526) = 1.20, p = .30), nor trust in the source, in this case, the statisticians responsible for 
producing the figures (F(2, 1525) = 1.24, p = .29). These findings complement the results 
from our lab experiments, which showed that a verbal cue such as “estimated” did not seem 
to communicate uncertainty to people and did not affect their trust in numbers or the source 
(as found in Experiments 3 and 4). In this field experiment, we again found communicating 
uncertainty as a numeric range did not affect people’s trust in the source, and it also did not 
affect trust in the number. 
 
In addition, the results showed no significant effects of uncertainty communication on affect 
(F(2, 1519) = 0.44, p = .65), competence of the source (F(2, 1525) = 0.61, p = .54), and 
trustworthiness of the journalist (F(2, 1526) = 0.86, p = .42). Participants’ judgments of the 
competence and trustworthiness of the statisticians were highly correlated (r = .80, p < .001), 
and on the high end of the scale (M = 5.44, SD = 1.41 and M = 5.28, SD = 1.55, respectively, 
out of seven); participants’ rating of the trustworthiness of the journalist was slightly lower 
(M = 4.61, SD = 1.54). These results suggest that communicating uncertainty to the 
participants of this field study, did not affect their (already positive) views of the 
trustworthiness and competence of the people involved in producing and reporting 
unemployment figures.        
 
Discussion 
 
Centuries of human thinking about uncertainty among many leaders, journalists, scientists, 
and policy-makers boils down to a simple and powerful intuition: “no one likes uncertainty” 
(1, 6, 7, 27). It is therefore often assumed that communicating uncertainty transparently will 
decrease public trust in science (1, 7). In this program of research, we set out to investigate 
whether such claims have any empirical basis. We did this by communicating epistemic 
uncertainty around basic facts and numbers and by systematically varying; a) the topic, b) the 
magnitude of the uncertainty, and c) the format and context through which uncertainty was 
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communicated. We assessed the effects of uncertainty communication on conceptually 
relevant outcome measures, including cognition and trust. 
 
Overall, we found little evidence to suggest that communicating numerical uncertainty about 
measurable facts and numbers backfires or elicits psychological reactance. Across five high-
powered studies and an internal meta-analysis, we show that people do recognize and 
perceive uncertainty when communicated around point estimates, both verbally and 
numerically (except when only words such as ‘estimated’ or ‘about’ are used to imply 
uncertainty). In addition, uncertainty did not seem to influence their affective reaction (see SI 
Appendix) and although the provision of uncertainty in general did slightly decrease people’s 
trust in and perceived reliability of the numbers, this effect emerged for explicit verbal 
uncertainty in particular.  
 
Our research offers an important bridge between producers of statistics, communicators, 
and their audiences. For example, statisticians or scientists could argue that because most 
numeric estimates are never completely certain, presenting uncertainty around the number 
offers more precise information and should therefore foster more trustworthiness, not less. 
Yet if a general audience had not considered that there might be any uncertainty around a 
number in the first place (e.g. around unemployment), then from a purely normative point of 
view people’s reaction to uncertainty in our studies is not entirely inappropriate: by providing 
clear variability around estimates, it is reasonable for people to adjust their level of trust in 
the numbers themselves. In a similar vein, one might argue that it is difficult for people to 
appraise the trustworthiness of a number without having access to the methodology through 
which the estimate is derived. However, from a social scientific standpoint, we recognize that 
people are frequently exposed to numbers in the news without necessarily having access to 
additional information, for example, about the quality of the underlying evidence (or indirect 
uncertainty). So how do people actually arrive at a judgment as to what numbers are reliable 
and trustworthy in the face of uncertainty? Although we did not set out explicitly to 
investigate the mechanism by which people adjust their judgments in response to uncertainty, 
an exploratory mediation analysis on the nationally representative sample (Experiment 4) 
clearly suggests that the main effect of uncertainty communication (uncertainty vs. no 
uncertainty) on trustworthiness is fully mediated by people’s perception of the uncertainty 
(see SI Appendix for mediation analyses). In other words, this suggests that the more 
uncertain people perceive the numbers to be, the less reliable and trustworthy they find them. 
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The current results help inform theoretical predictions about how people might respond to 
direct uncertainty about numbers and we encourage future research to further investigate 
potential mechanisms as well as how people might respond to indirect uncertainty, such as 
additional information about the quality of the underlying evidence.  
 
In sum, prior research has investigated whether the provision of uncertainty can help signal 
transparency and honesty on behalf of the communicator, or— in contrast—whether 
communicating uncertainty decreases trust and signals incompetence (9, 15, 17, 36). By and 
large, our findings illustrate that the provision of numerical uncertainty—in particular as a 
numeric range—does not substantially decrease trust in either the numbers or the source of 
the message. Verbal quantifiers of uncertainty, however, do seem to decrease both perceived 
reliability of the numbers as well as the perceived trustworthiness of the source. These 
findings were robust across topics (both contested and non-contested), mode of 
communication, and magnitude of uncertainty. More generally, the strong negative effects of 
verbal uncertainty appear consistent with prior findings that people are averse to more 
ambiguous statements (27, 43). As such, we hypothesize that the communication of 
numerical uncertainty may offer a degree of precision that reduces people’s tendency to view 
the admission of uncertainty as a sign of incompetence (1, 9, 36). On the other hand, across 
all studies, the communication of uncertainty never significantly increased perceived trust or 
reliability either, which is an important finding in itself and warrants further research.  
 
Accordingly, based on these results, we therefore recommend that the communication of 
uncertainty around basic facts and numbers in the media is best conveyed through numerical 
ranges with a point estimate. This format in particular did not seem to significantly influence 
[i.e. reduce] perceived trust and reliability in either the number or the source of uncertainty. 
In addition, we draw attention to the fact that using the word “estimate” or increasing the 
magnitude of the confidence interval did not seem to alter people’s perception of uncertainty, 
which points to the need to better contextualize the degree of uncertainty for people. 
 
Lastly, it is notable that we find little evidence for the motivated cognition of uncertainty 
(35). For example, even around more contested topics, such as global warming and 
immigration, although main effects were observed for people’s prior attitude toward the 
issue, there was no significant interaction with the communication of uncertainty. At the very 
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least, this suggests that motivated interpretations of uncertainty do not always occur. At the 
same time, we must acknowledge several limitations of our program of research.  
 
First, we recognize that people are known to struggle with psychological uncertainty about 
the future (44, 45), perhaps more so than uncertainty about measurable facts and numbers, an 
area previously neglected, and thus the focus of the current work. The context of our research 
was also limited, culturally, to the United Kingdom, and more contested examples for this 
population (e.g. around the UK’s political exit from the European Union) may have elicited 
different results. Moreover, whilst we conceptually replicated our results across multiple 
studies and platforms—including a preregistered national sample—we did not investigate 
uncertainty around more emotionally-charged topics in this study, such as uncertainty about 
personal health outcomes (e.g. cancer), nor manipulated ‘contestedness’ as an experimental 
factor. Indeed, there may be other circumstances (not examined here) where a significant 
degree of uncertainty could elicit strong emotional reactions. Finally, we attempted to 
improve the ecological and external validity of our manipulations by engaging in a novel 
real-world experiment on the live BBC News website. Although findings corroborated what 
we observed in controlled laboratory settings, the BBC study necessarily relied on a 
somewhat skewed and self-selected sample. In addition, although we generally relied on 
large and diverse samples, and our main effects were sufficiently powered, we may not have 
had sufficient power to detect very small effects in all post-hoc comparisons. Sensitivity 
analyses showed however that given the sample sizes of Experiments 3 and 4 (and assuming 
alpha = 0.05 and power of 0.80), we should have been able to detect small effects in these 
studies (f = .101, d = 0.20; and f = .107, d = 0.21, respectively). The smallest effects of 
interest reported in our paper are broadly beyond those thresholds (e.g. d = 0.26-0.72). 
 
Nonetheless, even considering all of these boundary conditions, our results help inform and 
challenge strongly held—and often non-empirical—assumptions across domains about how 
the public will react to the communication of uncertainty about basic science, facts, and 
numbers (1, 7). A key challenge to maintaining public trust in science is for communicators 
to be honest and transparent about the limitations of our current state of knowledge. The high 
degree of consistency in our results, across topics, magnitudes of uncertainty, and 
communication formats suggest that people “can handle the truth”. Yet, if we want to 
effectively convey uncertainty about pressing issues, such as rising sea levels, the number of 
tigers left in India, the state of the economy, or how many people turn out to presidential 
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elections; natural scientists, statisticians, and social scientists should work together to 
evaluate how to best present scientific uncertainty in an open and transparent manner. As 
such, our findings can provide valuable guidance to scientists, communicators, practitioners, 
and policy-makers alike, who are all united by a common interest in how to effectively 
communicate the truth in a so-called ‘post-truth’ world.  
 
Materials and Methods 
 
The survey experiments were completed in a web browser and took approximately 12 
minutes to complete. For Experiments 1 to 3, we recruited participants on the platform 
Prolific. Prolific has been found to be similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk in terms of data 
quality, and better suited to recruit UK-based participants (46, 47). Participants were paid 
£1.20 for their participation and were not allowed to participate in more than one experiment. 
For Experiment 4, we used Qualtrics Panels to recruit a sample that was nationally 
representative of the United Kingdom population in terms of gender, age, and region in 
which the participants lived. For Experiment 5, a field study, we collaborated with BBC 
News and recruited visitors of the BBC News website and app. This survey took 
approximately 2 minutes to complete. Ethical approval for this research was granted by the 
Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee (Experiments 1, 2 and 5) and the 
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee (Experiments 3 and 4) of the University of 
Cambridge. All participants gave informed consent before participation and received detailed 
debriefing information afterwards. The SI Appendix includes tables with an overview of the 
characteristics of the participants for each experiment (Table S1) and per condition in each 
experiment (Tables S2-S6), which show that the experimental groups were balanced in terms 
of participants’ age, gender, education level, and numeracy.    
 
Experiment 1 
Sample and design. In Experiment 1, we used a between-subjects design to test three forms 
of uncertainty communication (numeric vs. verbal vs. control) about three topics (tigers vs. 
unemployment vs. climate change). Based on a priori power calculations, which indicated we 
would need 1075 people for 90% power to detect a small (interaction) effect (f = 0.12) when 
alpha was set at 0.05, we decided to recruit 1125 participants (125 per cell of the design; we 
did this for Experiment 2 and 3 as well). Three of these participants indicated to be below 18 
years of age and were excluded from further analyses. The sample thus consisted of N = 1122 
people (769 women (68.5%), average age = 37.72, SD = 12.12, range = 18-72). Compared to 
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the UK population, this sample was relatively highly-educated. OECD data shows that 18.8% 
of the 24-65-year-olds in the UK attained primary and middle school education, 35.4% upper 
secondary education (GSCE & A-levels), and 45.7% attainted tertiary education (Bachelors, 
Masters, PhD, etc.)(48). In our sample, 1.6% indicated to have no educational qualifications, 
38.5% indicated to have attained upper secondary education, and 59.6% indicated to have 
attained tertiary education. On average, political orientation of the sample was slightly 
leaning towards liberal (M = 3.49, SD = 1.42, on a scale from 1 = very liberal to 7 = very 
conservative). 
 
Treatment and procedure. After agreeing to participate, participants were asked several 
questions about their beliefs related to the three topics: about the conservation of endangered 
animals, about the present state of the country and economy, and about climate change (for 
more information on all measures, see SI Appendix). After this, participants were randomly 
allocated to be presented with one of nine texts. For example, the text about unemployment 
read: 
“Recently, an official report came out with new information about the unemployment 
rate in the United Kingdom. This report stated that between April and June 2017, 
government statistics showed that an estimated 1,484,000 people in the UK were 
unemployed.” 
Participants in the control condition only read about this central estimate, without any 
information about uncertainty. For participants in the numeric uncertainty communication 
condition, the exact same sentence finished with a numeric range: “…unemployed (minimum 
1,413,000 to maximum 1,555,000).” For participants in the verbal uncertainty 
communication condition, an extra sentence was added to the text: “The report states that 
there is some uncertainty around this estimate, it could be somewhat higher or lower.” The 
control text about tigers reported that “an official report stated that in 2015 an estimated 
2226 tigers were left in India”. In the numeric uncertainty communication condition, a range 
of minimum 1,945 to maximum 2,491 was added and in the verbal uncertainty 
communication condition, the exact same sentence was used as in the unemployment 
condition. The text about climate change reported that “an official report stated that between 
1880 and 2012, the earth’s average global surface temperature has increased by an 
estimated 0.85ºC”. In the numeric uncertainty condition, a range of minimum 0.65 to 
maximum 1.06 was added, and once again the exact same sentence was used in the verbal 
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condition (somewhat higher or lower). These numbers are based on reports by the UK Office 
for National Statistics(49), the IUCN Red list(50), and the IPCC(51), respectively.  
 
Measures. After reading the text, participants first reported how the information made them 
feel on a standard feeling thermometer from 0 = negative/unhappy to 10 = positive/happy 
(results are reported in the SI Appendix). They were then asked to recall what number was 
reported in the text (open question), and whether they remembered any uncertainty being 
implied around this number (yes, no, don’t know, don’t remember). These questions served as 
manipulation checks and to increase the salience of the target number. The open text 
responses showed that most participants were able to either correctly recall the target number 
(in Experiment 2, where we coded all responses: 54.4%), or give a sensible approximation of 
the target number (Experiment 2: 30.2%), and indicated that generally participants 
understood what we meant with “this number” in the questions that followed.   
 
Next, our key dependent variables were assessed: perceived uncertainty of the number 
(average of 2 items, “To what extent do you think that this number is certain or uncertain?”, 1 
= very certain to 7 = very uncertain; “How much uncertainty do you think there is about this 
number?”, 10-point slider: not at all uncertain – very uncertain; r = .63), trust in the number 
(modelled after (9); average of 2 items, “To what extent do you think this number is reliable 
[trustworthy]?”, 7-point scale from 1 = not at all to 7 = very reliable [trustworthy]; r = .88), 
and trust in the source (“To what extent do you think the writers of this report are 
trustworthy?”, 7-point scale from 1 = not at all to 7 = very trustworthy). In addition, we also 
asked people to how uncertain the number made them feel (10-point slider, 1 = not at all to 
10 = very uncertain; results reported in the SI Appendix). After these dependent variables, a 
series of unrelated variables were assessed (for more information, see SI Appendix). The 
experiment finished with questions about demographic information and a detailed debrief.   
 
Experiment 2 
Sample and design. Experiment 2 followed on from Experiment 1. Instead of varying the 
topics however, we were interested in the effect of different magnitudes of uncertainty. This 
experiment therefore consisted of a control condition (no uncertainty communicated) plus a 2 
(numeric vs. verbal uncertainty communication) x 3 (lower vs. original vs. higher magnitude 
of uncertainty) factorial design; so a total of seven conditions, to which participants were 
randomly allocated. Based on a priori power calculations, which indicated we would need 
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752 participants for 90% power to detect a small (f = 0.13) interaction effect between format 
and magnitude when alpha was set at 0.05, we recruited 877 participants from Prolific 
(approx. 125 per cell for the 7-cell design). The sample consisted of 582 women and 292 men 
(average age = 34.68, SD = 12.02, range = 18-80). Similar to Experiment 1, this sample was 
relatively highly-educated compared to the UK population: 1.1% indicated to have no 
educational qualifications, 39% indicated to have attained upper secondary education, and 
59.8% indicated to have attained tertiary education. On average, political orientation of the 
sample was slightly leaning towards liberal (M = 3.40, SD = 1.42). 
 
Treatment and procedure. All participants read the same text as in Study 1 about 
unemployment, with either no uncertainty communicated, or uncertainty communicated 
numerically or verbally. The different magnitudes were either the original magnitude that was 
communicated in Experiment 1, which was a numerical range of 1,413,000 to 1,555,000 
(95% confidence interval around the point estimate of 1,484,000 unemployed people) or the 
sentence stating that the number could be “somewhat higher or lower”. However, in addition, 
lower uncertainty was communicated as a range of minimum 1,448,500 to maximum 
1,519,500 (a 68% CI around the point estimate, which is a range that is half as wide as the 
original) or through the wording “slightly higher or lower” (verbal condition). Higher 
uncertainty was communicated as a range of minimum 1,342,000 to maximum 1,626,000 
(99.99% CI, which is a range that is twice as wide as the original) or through the wording “a 
lot higher or lower”. Before reading this text, participants were asked some questions about 
their beliefs about the state of the country and economy and afterwards, they were asked the 
same exact questions as in Study 1 (see SI Appendix).  
 
Experiment 3 
 
Sample and design. In Experiment 3, we aimed to test various other numeric and verbal 
uncertainty communication formats, still in the context of unemployment for consistency 
using a relatively high magnitude of uncertainty. This study had eight conditions and we 
recruited N = 1200 participants from Prolific, based on power calculations that indicated this 
would give us 90% power to detect a small (f = 0.125) effect when alpha was set at 0.05. The 
sample consisted of 806 women and 388 men (average age = 36.65, SD = 11.98, range = 18-
85). Just as in Experiment 1 and 2, the sample was relatively highly educated compared to the 
UK population (no educational qualifications = 1.3%; upper secondary = 34.7%, tertiary 
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education = 63.7%) and on average slightly leaning towards a liberal political orientation (M 
= 3.40, SD = 1.38). After answering questions about their beliefs about the state of the 
country and economy, people read a version of the following text, which was designed to 
read more like a short news article to increase ecological validity: 
“UK unemployment drops 
Official figures from the first quarter of 2018 show that UK unemployment fell by 
116,000 compared with the same period last year. 
This puts the total number of people who are unemployed at 1.42 million.   
The number of those in work increased and wage growth improved over the same 
period. However, weak incomes have been a problem for a decade. "It will take a long 
period of wages rising above the rate of inflation for people to feel significantly better 
off” one economics commentator is quoted as saying.” 
This version served as the control condition. We tested three numeric uncertainty 
communication formats, three verbal formats, and a mixed numeric/verbal format (see Table 
1). 
 
Measures. After reading the text, participants were asked the same questions as in 
Experiments 1 and 2, except now specified for each number (the fall in unemployment and 
the total number of unemployed people) for the recall question, their perception of 
uncertainty around the numbers ( = .80) and trust in the numbers ( = .92). For the analyses, 
answers were averaged across both numbers given that there were no meaningful or 
significant differences between the two. Trust in the source was assessed with the item “To 
what extent do you think the civil servants who are responsible for these unemployment 
figures are trustworthy?” on a scale from 1 = not at all to 7 = very trustworthy. In addition, 
we asked people to what extent they thought journalists who write articles such as the one 
they read were trustworthy, and to what extent they thought government statistics in general 
were reliable (on scales from 1 = not at all to 7 = very trustworthy [reliable]).  
 
Experiment 4 
 
Sample and design. Experiment 4 was preregistered at aspredicted.org 
(http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=d3xu67). We recruited 1050 adults who lived in the UK 
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to participate in this study via Qualtrics Panels, based on power calculations that indicated we 
would need 995 participants to have 90% power to detect a small (f = 0.125) effect when 
alpha was set at 0.05. This sample was nationally representative of the general UK population 
in terms of age, gender, and geography quotas (51% female, mean age = 45.34 years, SD = 
16.47, age range = 18-86). In this sample, 8.9% of the participants had no educational 
qualifications, 44.8% had attained upper secondary education, and 46.1% had tertiary 
education. On average, the sample was again slightly leaning towards a liberal political 
orientation (M = 3.74, SD = 1.51). 
 
Treatment and procedure. We aimed to test whether we would find the same results when 
communicating uncertainty around a more contentious topic, so we presented people with a 
text about migration statistics based on a BBC News article of these Office of National 
Statistics figures(52): 
“Migration figures: EU migration still adding to UK population 
Official figures from last year show that there were 101,000 more people coming to 
the UK from the EU than leaving in 2017. This is the lowest EU net migration figure 
since 2013, but it means that EU migrants are still adding to the UK population. 
Net migration is the difference between the number of people coming to live in the 
UK for at least 12 months and those emigrating. The 2017 overall net migration figure 
(both from the EU and non-EU countries) is also down, from record highs in 2015 and 
early 2016.  
However, “The figures show that the government remains a long way off from 
meeting its objective to cut overall net migration, EU and non-EU, to the tens of 
thousands" one Home Affairs correspondent is quoted as saying.” 
 
This experiment had five conditions (see also Table 1): besides the control condition (above, 
no uncertainty), uncertainty was communicated numerically with a range after the point 
estimate (“…101,000 (range between 68,000 and 132,000)”), or via “+/- two standard errors” 
(“…101,000 (+/- 33,000)”); or verbally using the word “around” before the estimate of 
101,000, or with an explicit verbal statement (“… leaving in 2017. The report states there is 
uncertainty around the exact figure - it could be higher or lower”).  
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Measures. Before reading the text, participants answered demographic questions and 
questions about their beliefs about the state of society and the economy and their attitudes 
towards migration (with three items from the European Social Survey(53): “Would you say it 
is generally good for the UK’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?” 
1 = Very bad for the economy to 7 = Very good for the economy; “Would you say that the 
UK’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from 
other countries?” 1 = Cultural life undermined to 7 = Cultural life enriched; “Is the UK made 
a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” 1 = 
Worse place to live to 7 = better place to live;  = .91). After reading the text, participants 
answered the same questions as in Experiments 1 and 2. Perceived trustworthiness of the 
source was assessed with the item “To what extent do you think the civil servants who are 
responsible for these migration figures are trustworthy?” on a scale from 1 = not at all to 7 = 
very trustworthy. In addition, we asked people to what extent they thought the conclusions 
based on the number; the news article they just read; and journalists who write articles such 
as the one they read were trustworthy, and to what extent government statistics in general 
were reliable (on scales from 1 = not at all to 7 = very trustworthy [reliable]).  
 
Experiment 5: Field experiment with BBC News 
Sample and design. For this field experiment, we worked with BBC News and the BBC’s 
Head of Statistics. After gaining experience with the process of running a field experiment in 
this context during a Pilot Study in September 2019 (see SI Appendix), we conducted the 
experiment on the 15
th
 of October 2019 using BBC News Online’s coverage of the October 
Labour Market Release from the UK Office for National Statistics. After the labour market 
figures were released, we worked with the relevant team of journalists and the Head of 
Statistics to select a target figure to communicate uncertainty around before the news article 
was published on the website. The journalists were responsible for the content of the news 
article. The target figure we selected was the UK unemployment rate, which was the first 
figure mentioned in the news story (see Figure 6). The field experiment had three conditions: 
visitors of the website were randomly shown a version of the news article in which the target 
figure was presented without any uncertainty (“… rose to 3.9%”); with a verbal uncertainty 
cue (“… rose to an estimated 3.9%”); or with a numeric range and verbal cue (“… rose to an 
estimated 3.9% (between 3.7%-4.1%)”). At the bottom of the first paragraph of the news 
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article, readers were invited to “Click here to take part in a short study about this article run 
by the University of Cambridge.”  
 
BBC News website visitors were able to participate in the study for about 24 hours. During 
that time, 2462 people clicked on the survey link, which took people to the starting page of 
the online survey with information about the study and informed consent. The survey was 
completed by 1700 people (18 of which completed the dependent variables but not 
demographics): 549 people in the control condition, 557 in the numeric condition, and 594 in 
the verbal condition. A technical issue that was created when the journalistic team updated 
the story after its first release resulted in participants in both experimental conditions also 
being shown the control condition version of the story, without any uncertainty mentioned, 
between 10:00am and 10:49am UK time. We therefore had to exclude all participants in the 
experimental conditions who participated between in that time frame, which were 69 
participants in the numerical and 94 in the verbal condition. We also excluded five 
participants who reported to be below 18 years of age, and one outlier who reported being 
114 years old (which we researched and was extremely unlikely). The final sample consisted 
of 1531 people: 520 participants in the control condition, 463 in the numerical condition, and 
470 in the verbal condition. We had no control over the exact number of people that would 
participate in this field study, so we conducted a sensitivity analysis to compute the effect 
size that we should be able to detect with 1531 participants in three groups,  = 0.05 and 90% 
power: which is a small effect, f = 0.09. There were 1131 men (73.9%) and 344 women 
(22.5%) who participated, with an average age of 44.82 (SD = 15.29, range = 18-86). The 
sample was relatively highly educated: 30.5% indicated to have obtained a higher degree 
(MSc, PhD, or equivalent), 43.6% a Bachelor’s degree, 22.5% school (GCSE, A-level, or 
equivalent) and 1% indicated to have not completed formal education.  
 
Measures. After reading information about the study and providing informed consent, 
participants first answered a question about their current affective state, “how does the 
information you just read make you feel?”, on a feeling thermometer from 0 = 
negative/unhappy to 10 = positive/happy, and subsequently a comprehension question (see SI 
Appendix). Next, we assessed perceived uncertainty (“How certain or uncertain do you think 
the unemployment rate figure in the story is?”, on a scale from 1 = very certain to 7 = very 
uncertain), trust in the number (“How trustworthy do you think the unemployment rate figure 
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in the story is?”, 1 = not at all trustworthy to 7 = very trustworthy), trust in the source (“How 
trustworthy do you think the statisticians responsible for producing the figure are?”, 1 = not 
at all trustworthy to 7 = very trustworthy), competence of the source (“How competent do 
you think the statisticians responsible for producing the figure are?”, 1 = not at all competent 
to 7 = very competent), and trust in the journalistic source (“How trustworthy do you think 
the journalist responsible for writing the story is?”, 1 = not at all trustworthy to 7 = very 
trustworthy). The questionnaire finished with asking participants for their age, gender, and 
the highest level of education they had completed.  
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Data Availability 
The datasets collected and analysed in these studies will be available on the OSF website 
upon publication. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. The results of Experiment 1: Means per condition for perceived uncertainty (Panel 
a), trust in numbers (Panel b), and trust in the source (Panel c). The error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals around the means and jitter represents the distribution of the underlying 
data. 
 
Figure 2. The results of Experiment 2: Means per condition for perceived uncertainty (Panel 
a), trust in numbers (Panel b), and trust in the source (Panel c). The error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals around the means and jitter represents the distribution of the underlying 
data. 
 
Figure 3. The results of Experiment 3: Means per condition for perceived uncertainty (Panel 
a), trust in numbers (Panel b), and trust in the source (Panel c). The error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals around the means and jitter represents the distribution of the underlying 
data. 
 
Figure 4. The results of Experiment 4: Means per condition for perceived uncertainty (Panel 
a), trust in numbers (Panel b), and trust in the source (Panel c). The error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals around the means and the jitter represents the distribution of the 
underlying data. 
 
Figure 5. Random-effects meta-analysis. Perceived uncertainty (Panel A), trust in numbers 
(Panel B), and trust in the source (Panel C). 
 
Figure 6. Image of the BBC News article that was used in Experiment 5 (numerical 
condition: including a numeric range). Copyright BBC, reproduced with permission. 
 
Figure 7. The results of field Experiment 5: Means per condition for perceived uncertainty 
(Panel a), trust in numbers (Panel b), and trust in the source (Panel c). The error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals around the means and the jitter represents the distribution 
of the underlying data. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Overview of the conditions and manipulation texts of Experiment 3 and 4. 
Format Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
Control (no uncertainty) “Official figures from the first 
quarter of 2018 show that UK 
unemployment fell by 116,000 
compared with the same period 
last year. […]” 
“Migration figures: EU 
migration still adding to UK 
population. Official figures from 
last year show that there were 
101,000 more people coming to 
the UK from the EU than 
leaving in 2017. This is the 
lowest EU net migration figure 
since 2013, but it means that EU 
migrants are still adding to the 
UK population. […]” 
Numerical range with 
point estimate 
… by 116,000 (range between 
17,000 and 215,000)… 
…101,000 (range between 
68,000 and 132,000)… 
Numerical range 
without point estimate 
…by between 17,000 and 
215,000… 
 
Numerical point 
estimate +/- two 
standard errors 
…by 116,000 (+/- 99,000)… …101,000 (+/- 33,000)… 
Verbal explicit 
uncertainty statement 
…by 116,000 compared with the 
same period last year, although 
there is some uncertainty around 
this figure: it could be somewhat 
higher or lower. […] 
…101,000 more people coming 
to the UK from the EU than 
leaving in 2017. The report 
states there is uncertainty around 
the exact figure - it could be 
higher or lower. […] 
Verbal implicit 
uncertainty statement 
…by 116,000 compared with the 
same period last year, although 
there is a range around this 
figure: could be somewhat 
higher or lower. […] 
 
Verbal uncertainty 
word  
…by an estimated 116,000… … around 101,000… 
Mixed numerical and 
verbal phrase 
…by an estimated 116,000 (+/- 
99,000)… 
 
 
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
Control Numerical Verbal
M
ea
n 
sc
or
e
Perceived uncertainty
a
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Control Numerical Verbal
M
ea
n 
sc
or
e
Trust in number
b
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Control Numerical Verbal
S
co
re
Trust in source
c
Low uncertainty Actual uncertainty High uncertainty
Numerical Verbal Numerical Verbal Numerical Verbal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
M
ea
n 
sc
or
e
Perceived uncertainty
a
Low uncertainty Actual uncertainty High uncertainty
Numerical Verbal Numerical Verbal Numerical Verbal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
M
ea
n 
sc
or
e
Trust in number
b
Low uncertainty Actual uncertainty High uncertainty
Numerical Verbal Numerical Verbal Numerical Verbal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
S
co
re
Trust in source
c
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Control Numerical
ï
Numerical
Range
Estimate
Numerical
Range
No Estimate
Verbal
Cue
Verbal
Explicit
Verbal
Implicit
Mixed
Numerical/
Verbal
M
ea
n 
S
co
re
Perceived uncertainty
a
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Control Numerical
ï
Numerical
Range
Estimate
Numerical
Range
No Estimate
Verbal
Cue
Verbal
Explicit
Verbal
Implicit
Mixed
Numerical/
Verbal
M
ea
n 
sc
or
e
Trust in number
b
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Control Numerical
ï
Numerical
Range
Estimate
Numerical
Range
No Estimate
Verbal
Cue
Verbal
Explicit
Verbal
Implicit
Mixed
Numerical/
Verbal
S
co
re
Trust in source
c
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Control Numerical
ï
Numerical
Range
Verbal
Explicit
Verbal
Cue
M
ea
n 
sc
or
e
Perceived uncertainty
a
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Control Numerical
ï
Numerical
Range
Verbal
Explicit
Verbal
Cue
M
ea
n 
sc
or
e
Trust in number
b
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Control Numerical
ï
Numerical
Range
Verbal
Explicit
Verbal
Cue
S
co
re
Trust in source
c


12
3
4
5
6
7
Control Numerical Verbal
S
co
re
Perceived uncertainty
a
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Control Numerical Verbal
S
co
re
Trust in number
b
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Control Numerical Verbal
S
co
re
Trust in source
c
